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INTRODUCTION 
The strength of a society based on the rule of law can be measured by its 
ability to cope with extraordinary situations.  It is under these conditions 
that constitutional guarantees of individual rights are in the greatest tension 
with the state’s need for self–preservation. There are times in any nation 
when extraordinary power must be used, notwithstanding many risks that 
are run when a state of exception (a.k.a. state of emergency, national 
emergency, state of siege, state of alert, state of readiness, situation of 
public danger, regime of full powers, regime of counterterrorist operations, 
prompt measures of security, etc., as referred to in different countries of the 
world) is declared.  World history, including the history of Britain, the U.S., 
and other democratic nations, contains dozens of examples of when 
governments in dire straits were forced to acquire and exercise 
extraordinary powers or face extinction.1  It is obvious that providing for 
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 1.   President Lincoln’s actions during the Civil War and President Roosevelt’s 
measures during the Great Depression are graphic illustrations here. 
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regulation of governmental powers in emergencies is the best way to protect 
individual liberty and ensure the swiftest return to constitutional normalcy.  
Well–conceived and publicly debated legislative or especially constitutional 
provisions, adopted long in advance of the actual emergence of grave 
dangers, but invoked and strictly regulating governmental conduct during 
times of crisis may, on the one hand, be far more palatable than doing 
nothing at all, and, on the other hand, prevent society from gross abuse of 
governmental powers in the name of “salvation of the country in the time of 
dire straits.”2 
In 1948, Clinton L. Rossiter observed in his famous book, Constitutional 
Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies, “[n]o 
democracy ever went through a period of thoroughgoing constitutional 
dictatorship without some permanent and often unfavourable alteration in its 
governmental scheme . . . . [a] constitution which fails to provide for 
whatever emergency action may become necessary to defend the state is 
simply defective.”3 
It is hard to disagree with Daniel P. Franklin that “necessity dictates the 
exercise of emergency powers, at times, in any republic.”4  However, the 
scholar seems to give an unreasonably and inadequately broad definition to 
the concept of “necessity.”  According to Franklin, “it is at these times that 
a government must act beyond formal constitutional control.”5  It is quite 
understandable that after the “attack on America” of 11 September 2001  
that this approach is shared by a significant and influential segment of the 
U.S. political elite.  Yet the times of Oliver Cromwell, who stated in his 
speech to Parliament on 12 September 1654, “necessity hath no law,”6 seem 
  
 2. On 5 July 1987, in the article, “Reagan Advisors Ran Secret Government,” The 
Miami Herald revealed that Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) had drafted a contingency plan providing for the suspension 
of the Constitution, the imposition of martial law, abolition of state and local legislatures and 
their replacement with military commanders, and the round-up and detention in relocation 
camps of dissidents in the event of a national crisis.  The plan, secretly obtained by The 
Miami Herald, provided for an executive order that former President Reagan would sign but 
not make public until a crisis broke.  Although the White House denied that the executive 
order was ever signed, according to Jules Lobel, “some congressional sources believe that 
President Reagan did sign an executive order in 1984 and revised national military 
mobilization measures to deal with civilians in a national crisis.”  During the Iran-Contras 
hearings in the U.S. Congress in July of 1987, a question posed to Lieutenant Colonel Oliver 
North about the FEMA plan was referred to as a ‘closed session.’  Jules Lobel, Emergency 
Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, n.1 (1989); MICHAEL LINFIELD, 
FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: U.S. CIVIL LIBERTIES IN TIMES OF WAR 165-67 (1990). 
 3. CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN 
THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 13, 301 (1948) (emphasis added). 
 4. DANIEL P. FRANKLIN, EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES 3 (1991). 
 5. Id. (emphasis added). 
 6. Cromwell continued: “Feigned necessities, imaginary necessities . . . are the 
greatest cozenage men can put upon the providence of God . . . .”  Mark M. Stavsky, The 
Doctrine of State Necessity in Pakistan, 16 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 341, 343 n.7 (1983) (quoting 
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to be over.  Emergency powers, including introduction of a state of 
exception, cannot and should not be exercised “beyond constitutional 
control.”  It is true that, in many countries of the world, even constitutional 
provisions cannot always firmly and effectively contain the dictatorial 
instincts of authorities; but that is not a justification to lift “constitutional 
control” altogether.  On the contrary, it is quite easy to imagine what would 
happen if this last obstacle, the Constitution, were to be removed from the 
way of some politicians and social forces thirsting for unlimited power. 
Yet, a question remains: what happens if a constitution and the whole 
legal order of a nation “fails to provide for whatever emergency action may 
become necessary to defend the state?”  What happens if, using a modern 
term, a nation loses a “War on Terror?”  
The catastrophe of the Russian Empire gives an answer to such questions 
and offers one of the most vivid lessons and graphic illustrations in the 
history of the world. We, the Russians, paid dearly for those lessons. 
I.    RUSSIAN HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 
In the whole body of the Russian Imperial legislation (from the 
seventeenth to early twentieth centuries), one can hardly find a statute that 
has been as much misinterpreted and misrepresented by either Russian (and 
Soviet) or Western commentators as the law “On Measures for the 
Preservation of the State Order and Public Tranquillity” (O merakh k 
okhraneniiu gosudarstvennogo poriadka i obschestvennogo spokoistvia),  
also known as the Emergency Law of 1881.7  
The coinciding views of Bolsheviks and some foreign scholars on this 
law is astonishing.  A founder of the Soviet state, Vladimir Ulyanov (a.k.a. 
Lenin), called it “Russia’s de facto constitution,”8 and Richard Pipes called 
it “the most important piece of legislation in the history of imperial Russia . 
. . . [t]he real constitution under which . . . Russia has been ruled ever 
since.”9   In his denunciation of the emergency law, Pipes cited Alexei A. 
  
4 THOMAS CARLYLE, CROMWELL’S LETTERS AND SPEECHES 65 (1870)); Lobel, supra note 2, 
at 1386 (quoting Radin, Martial Law & the State of Siege, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 634, 641 
(1942)). 
 7. SVOD ZAKONOV ROSSIYSKOY IMPERII [SZ] [CODE OF LAWS OF THE RUSSIAN 
EMPIRE] Aug. 14, 1881, art. 53. 
 8. 21 V.I. LENIN, Tri Zaprosa [Three Questions], in POLNOE SOBRANIE SOCHINENIY 
[COMPLETE WORKS] 104, 114 (Gosudarstvenoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 5th ed. 
1961) (1912).   
 9. RICHARD PIPES, RUSSIA UNDER THE OLD REGIME 305 (1974) (also published in 
Russia in 1993). The full quotation reads: “On 14 August 1881, Alexander III signed into 
law the most important piece of legislation in the history of imperial Russia between the 
abolition of serfdom in 1861 and the October Manifesto of 1905, and more durable than 
either . . . . [t]his document . . . has been the real constitution under which - brief interludes 
apart - Russia has been ruled ever since.”     
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Lopukhin,10 a former procurator, head of the Police Department (1902–
1905), and Governor of Estlandia (1905) who became “disillusioned,” 
passed secret information to the revolutionaries, was tried for disclosing a 
state secret, and spent three years in Siberian exile (a microscopic term 
compared to punishments for similar crimes in Europe or America).11  What 
Pipes didn’t mention is that Lopukhin’s report, with his criticism of the 
Emergency Law (“a remarkable pamphlet,” as Pipes called it), was first 
published in Geneva in 1905 with an introduction by the same Bolshevik 
leader Lenin.12 
Another American researcher alleged that Russia’s “rulers . . . were 
nearly all apparently uncomfortable with the maintenance of that unpopular 
legislation, especially since their European role models no longer invoked 
such rules.”13 
  
 10. PIPES, supra note 9, at 306-07.  Again, in the words of Pipes, “[t]he significance 
of this legislation [Emergency Law of 1881] can perhaps be best summarised in the words 
of” A.A. Lopukhin, according to whom, “in matters affecting state security there no longer 
were any objective criteria of guilt: guilt was determined by the subjective impression of 
police officials.” Id. at 307. See also A.A. LOPUKHIN, NASTOIASCHCHEE I BUDUSHCHEE 
RUSSKOI POLITSII [RUSSIAN POLICE TODAY AND TOMORROW] (V.M. Sablin ed., 1907).  See 
generally A.A. LOPUKHIN, OTRYVKI IZ VOSPAMINANII PO POVODU VOSPAMINANII GR. S.I.U. 
VITTE [EXCERPTS FROM MEMOIRS] (1923). 
 11. Through a Menshevik journalist, Vladimir Burtsev, in 1908 Lopukhin revealed 
the identity of a famous police secret agent Evno Azef.  In 1912, Lopukhin was amnestied, 
returned to Moscow, and was promoted to a position of Vice Director of Siberia Trade Bank.  
In 1923 he emigrated, and died in 1928 being a member of a board of directors of an 
international commerce bank in Paris.  See details of the case in: BORIS NIKOLAEVSKY, 
ISTORIA ODNOGO PREDATELYA. TERRORISTY I POLITICHESKAYA POLITSIA [A STORY OF A 
TRAITOR: TERRORISTS AND POLITICAL POLICE] (1999) (1932).  Anatoly Kukanov, A.A. 
Lopukhin - zhertva obstoyatel’stv ili soznatel’ny dissident [A.A. Lopukhin - a Victim of 
Circumstances or a Conscientious Dissident]; ZHANDARMY ROSSII (POLITICHESKY ROZYSK V 
ROSSII XV-XX VEK [RUSSIA’S GENDARMERIE: POLITICAL SEARCH IN RUSSIA 15-20TH 
CENTURIES] 437-46 (2002); K.N. MOROZOV, PARTIIA SOTSIALISTOV-REVOLIUTSIONEROV V 
1907-1914 GG. [PARTY OF SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES IN 1907-1914] (1998);  ANNA 
GEIFMAN, ENTANGLED IN TERROR: THE AZEF AFFAIR AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION (2000). 
 12. It is also indicative that Boris Savinkov, one of the most well-known Russian 
terrorists, considered Lopukhin “trustworthy,” because he “broke up with his [social] 
environment.”  JEAN LONGE & GEORGY ZILBER, TERRORISTY I OKHRANKA [TERRORISTS 
AND OKHRANKA] 67 (Sovetskaya Rossia rev. ed. 1991) (1924). 
 13. Jonathan W. Daly, On the Significance of Emergency Legislation in Late 
Imperial Russia, 54 SLAVIC REV. 602, 603 (1995) [hereinafter Daly, Significance].  The 
article was subsequently used in Daly’s remarkable monograph JONATHAN W. DALY, 
AUTOCRACY UNDER SIEGE: SECURITY POLICE AND OPPOSITION IN RUSSIA 1866-1905 
(1998) (citing Jonathan W. Daly, On the Significance of Emergency Legislation in Late 
Imperial Russia, 54 SLAVIC REV. 602, 603 (1995)  [hereinafter DALY, AUTOCRACY]). 
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II.  EUROPEAN EXAMPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRISES AND EMERGENCY               
STATUTES 
In reality, neither the fact of issuance of the Emergency Law in Russia, 
nor its substance, nor its use, was unique.  Adoption of special statutes 
regulating the legal regime of a state of emergency was a common trend of 
European lawmaking (Prussia, Austria-Hungary, Spain, etc.) in the middle 
and second half of the nineteenth century.   
Russia’s traditional “European role model,” France, was the first country 
on the continent that passed the first statute in this sphere. Following 
declaration of a state of siege (etat de siege) in Paris in June-October 1848, 
a special act was adopted on 9 August 1849. The emergency law was 
repeatedly invoked throughout the second part of the nineteenth century, 
including during the period of 1871–1876 when nearly all territory of the 
country was under a state of siege, and led to repressions of a much greater 
magnitude than in Russia.  A new French law on a state of siege was 
adopted on 3 April 1878, the year after the issuance of the first Russian law 
on the procedure of military assistance to civil authorities14 and three years 
before the issuance of the first Russian law on a state of emergency.15 In 
Clinton Rossiter’s conclusion, “[n]o instrument of crisis government 
conform[ed] so closely to the theory of constitutional dictatorship as the 
famed and widely-imitated state of siege” in France.16 
On 19 October 1878, a notorious emergency Anti–Socialist Law 
(Sozialistengesetze) was adopted in Germany, as probably the most 
important repressive law of Bismarck’s chancellorship.  In twelve years of 
the law’s existence, a state of siege was declared and repeatedly extended 
against ‘socialists’ in Berlin, Potsdam, Leipzig, Hamburg, Scharlottenburg, 
and the districts of Telt, Niderbarnim, and Ost–Havelland.  The law banned 
all Social Democratic associations, meetings, and newspapers. By 1890, 
about 1,500 people were sentenced to more than 800 years’ imprisonment.17   
A scholar of emergency regimes in nineteenth century Latin America 
correctly argues that “parallel studies of Spain, France, Italy, Germany, 
Portugal, and the United States would find regimes of exception, methods of 
repressing ethnic and religious minorities, political opposition to rising 
labor movements, and claims of defending the constitutional order.”18  
  
 14. POLNOE SOBRANIE ZAKONOV ROSSIISKOI IMPERII [PSZ] [COMPLETE COLLECTION 
OF LAWS OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE] II, v. LII, 1877, No.57748. 
 15. See, e.g., OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: 
EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 26-32 (2006).  
 16. ROSSITER, supra note 3, at 129. 
 17. Anti-Socialist Law (October 21, 1878), http://www.germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/pdf/eng/713_Anti%20Socialist%20Law_218.pdf (complete English text of the law 
and statistics of repressions from the web site of German History in Documents and Images 
(GHDI), an initiative of the German Historical Institute in Washington, DC). 
 18. BRIAN LOVEMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF TYRANNY 7 (1993). 
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Needless to say, European states resorted even more cruelly, massively, and 
regularly to emergency measures in their colonial possessions in Africa and 
Asia.19 
The Russian understanding of the essence of emergency powers was by 
no means unique either.  It was similar to generally accepted views in the 
European (“continental”) legal tradition.  
“In life of each state such critical moments occur,” Professor N.M. 
Korkunov of St. Petersburg University20 wrote in his Comparative Study of 
State Law of Foreign Countries, “when integrity and even existence of a 
state can depend on a single minute, when the state cannot think about some 
far away general goals, but rather save itself by any means.”21  After that, 
N.M. Korkunov made a logical conclusion, comparable by its laconic 
definition to the famous Cicero’s maxim, “[s]elf–restriction of the power 
with law cannot go to such extreme, when the state would bring its own 
existence as prey to this principle.”22  The scholar argued that just like “a 
right of self–defence” is recognised and enjoyed by “private persons,” the 
same right should be exercised by “state authorities” and concluded, “[i]n 
cases of extreme external or internal danger, state power should undertake 
emergency measures of defence, including temporary restrictions of civil 
rights.”23 
“State necessity is superior to individual freedom,” agreed his colleague 
Vladimir M. Gessen, Professor of St. Petersburg University, deputy of the 
III and IV Dumas, and member of the Central Committee of the 
Constitutional Democracy Party (“kadet”).  “If in normal circumstances of 
state and social life a contemporary state recognises and guarantees 
individual freedom, then in emergency circumstances it makes it 
  
 19. See, e.g., NASSER HUSSAIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EMERGENCY: COLONIALISM 
AND THE RULE OF LAW (2003). 
 20. For more on Nikolay Mikhailovich Korkunov, his writings, and legal views see 
George L. Yaney, Bureaucracy and Freedom: N.M. Korkunov’s Theory of the State, 71 AM. 
HISTORY REV. 468-86 (1996). 
 21. N.M. KORKUNOV, SRAVNITELNIY OCHERK GOSUDARSTVENNOGO PRAVA 
INOSTRANNYKH DERZHAV. CHAST’ PERVAYA. GOSUDARSTVO I EGO ELEMENTY [COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF STATE LAW OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES. PART ONE. STATE AND ITS ELEMENTS] 148-49 
(1906). 
 22. Cicero (106-43 BC) formulated his famous maxim: “Social necessity is the 
supreme law” (Salus populi [or Salus rei publicae] suprema lex esto) (III, 4, 8) in an 
unfinished dialogue On Laws (De Legibus; begun approximately in 52 BC). M. TVLLI 
CICERONIS, DIALOGI: O GOSUDARSTVE – O ZAKONAKH [ON STATE. ON LAWS] 135 (I.N. 
Veselovsky et al. eds., 1966). 
 23. KORKUNOV, supra note 21, at 148-49.  See, e.g., N.M. KORKUNOV, OBSCHAYA 
TEORIA PRAVA [GENERAL THEORY OF LAW] (2000) (Another famous book recently translated 
and published in the U.S. in the ‘Law Classic’ series). 
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subordinate to the interests of security and maybe even of the existence of 
the state.”24  
The views reflected in the citations of Korkunov and Gessen are hardly 
different from the dominating position on the subject of this study in the 
European law of the second half of the nineteenth century, represented in 
the works of such German, French, and Swiss legal scholars as Edgar 
Loening, Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, Lorenz von Stein, and Maurice Block.  
III.   RUSSIAN EMERGENCY LAW OF 1881 
Analysis of the Russian Emergency Law of 1881 should be started with 
putting it into a more general context of Russian law of the pre–Soviet 
period, with a special reference to those facts that are often ignored or 
dismissed as not fitting into an image of Russia as a land of a “thousand 
years of terror and repressions.” 
Demonization of Russian history by both Communist and some Western 
authors is amazing indeed.  Coverage of the reign of Ivan IV, or Ivan the 
Terrible (1547–1584), is one of numerous examples.  Even his nickname 
“the Terrible,” “le Terrible,” or “der Schrekliche,” is not just a wrong 
translation of “Grozny” (which actually means “the Stern”), but also a 
pejorative term that was introduced to European historiography by Ivan 
IV’s (or rather, Russia’s) opponents in France, Lithuania, and Poland.25  In 
reality, Ivan IV—one of the most educated European monarchs of the 
Middle Ages, known in his inner circle as an “English tsar” who proposed 
marriage to Queen of England Elizabeth I (but was rejected),26 owner of the 
largest library in Europe, and who, like Thomas Jefferson in the U.S., 
doubled the territory of the country—can be called “Terrible” only in the 
sense that his despotism is terribly exaggerated. 
In an account by the leading Russian scholar on Ivan IV, as a result of 
“mass terror” during thirty–seven years of his rule, from three to four 
thousand people out of an approximately ten million person Russian 
population were executed.27 For comparison, in the same sixteenth century in 
England (with a smaller population than in Russia), seventy two thousand 
tramps and beggars (former peasants who lost their land) were executed during 
the reign of Henry VIII.28  In the Netherlands, during the reign of Kings Karl V 
  
 24. V.M. GESSEN, ISKLUCHITEL’NOE POLOZHENIE [A STATE OF EXCEPTION] 109 
(1908).  See also V.M. GESSEN, LEKTSII PO POLITSEISKOMU PRAVU [LECTURES ON POLICE 
LAW] 97 (1908).  
 25. See R.WIPPER, IVAN GROZNY [IVAN THE TERRIBLE] 202-11 (J. Fineberg, trans., 
1947). 
 26. See John Vincent, “Ivan The Terrible Rude (Letter To Elizabeth I Found)”, THE 
TELEGRAPH (London) (Feb. 1, 2003), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-
news/1051442/posts. 
 27. See R.G. SKRYNNIKOV, IVAN GROZNIY [IVAN THE TERRIBLE] 191 (1975). 
 28. See I.N. OSINOVSKIY, THOMAS MOORE 62 (1974). 
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and Philip II, the “number of victims [of the Inquisition] . . . reached 
100,000.”29 On 23 August 1572, another contemporary of Ivan IV, French 
King Karl IX personally participated in the slaughter of more than three 
thousand Huguenots in the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, whose only “crime” 
or “sin” was that they belonged not to Catholicism, but to Protestantism.  In 
other words, during one night in France, approximately the same number of 
people were killed as during twenty–seven years of Ivan IV’s reign.  But the 
Massacre of St. Bartholomew continued, and during the two week slaughter 
about 30,000 Protestants were murdered.30  In 1542, 500 “witches” were 
burned in Geneva alone.31   
All in all, in the estimation of Vadim Kozhinov, in the sixteenth century, 
“in the main countries of Western Europe (Spain, France, the Netherlands, 
England) . . . at least 300,000–400,000 people were executed,”32 unless we 
trust a new 2004 783-page study of Vatican scholars downsizing the 
Inquisition.33  That doesn’t mean that we should admire and glorify Ivan IV 
for the fact that under his reign “only” 3,000–4,000 people were executed.  
But there was nothing “uniquely Russian” about Ivan IV’s terror. On the 
contrary, even now, Henry VIII, Philip II, and Karl IX are highly respected 
kings in their countries, whereas in Russia, Ivan IV has been damned for 
centuries.  Vadim Kozhinov reminded his readers that, when in 1862 a 
monument commemorating one thousand years of Russian history was 
erected in Novgorod, there was no room for Ivan IV among 109 figures of 
Russian tsars, military commanders, and heroes.  Needless to say, the 
Russians have never built a monument to Ivan IV personally.34 
IV. THE GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LAW 
The last half–century of the Imperial rule has a deserved reputation as 
the “Golden Age” of Russian law.  The Law of 17 April 1863 abolished 
corporal punishment in the civil institutions, army, and fleet (save through 
  
 29. See I. R. GRIGULEVICH, ISTORIA INKVIZITSII [HISTORY OF INQUISITION] 271 
(1970).  
 30. See S.G. LOZINSKIY, ISTORIA PAPSTVA [HISTORY OF THE PAPACY]  305 (1961). 
 31. See E.B. CHERNYAK, SUDYII ZAGOVORSCHIKI [JUDGES AND PLOTTERS] 185 (1984). 
 32. See VADIM KOZHINOV, ISTORIA RUSI I RUSSKOGO SLOVA. SOVREMENNIY VZGLYAD 
[HISTORY OF RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE: A MODERN VIEW] 29 (1997), available at 
http://www.hrono.ru/libris/ruslovo_01.html. 
 33. See, e.g, Vatican to release study on Inquisition, CATHOLICCULTURE.ORG, (June 
4, 2004), http://www.catholicculture.org/news/features/index.cfm?recnum=30105; Bootie 
Cosgrove-Mather, Vatican Looks Back At Inquisition: Research Provokes Varied Reactions 
Among Religious Leaders, CBS NEWS (June 16, 2004), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/06/15/world/main623253.shtml; Vatican downgrades 
Inquisition toll, MSNBC (June 15, 2004), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5218373/. 
 34. KOZHINOV, supra note 32 at 32-33. 
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peasant courts).35 Anatole Leroy–Beaulieu (1842–1912), a French scholar, 
member of the Academie des Sciences Morales (since 1887), Professor of 
the Free School of Political Science (and its Director in 1906–1912), and 
author of a three–volume study The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians, 
termed the Russian criminal code of the nineteenth century “probably the 
mildest code in Europe.”36  Leroy–Beaulieu was not the only foreign 
observer who came to such a conclusion.  Before him, Albert F. Heard, an 
author of two remarkable articles in Harper’s New Monthly Magazine in 
1887–1888 (and apparently living in Russia in those years),37 used the same 
words to characterise the Russian penal code as “one of the mildest in 
Europe.”38   
In the opinion of Marc Szeftel, one of the most distinguished American 
specialists in Russian Imperial Law, Russia’s Charter on Criminal 
Procedure (Ustav ugolovnogo sudoproizvodstva) of 20 November 186439 
“may be considered as the Russian parallel to the Habeas Corpus Act.”40   
Another American scholar correctly observed that in the last decades of the 
Imperial rule, “the Russian legal profession flowered, producing 
distinguished practitioners, judges, and legal scholars, successfully 
challenging in several celebrated jury trials an absolutist autocracy.”41 
  
 35. 2 N.S. TAGANTSEV, RUSSKOE UGOLOVNOE PRAVO [RUSSIAN CRIMINAL LAW] 
1031 (2nd ed. 1902) 
 36. 2 ANATOLE LEROY-BEAULIEU, THE EMPIRE OF THE TSARS AND THE RUSSIANS 394 
(Zenaide A. Ragozin trans., 3d Fr. ed. 1894).    
 37. Albert F. Heard, Russia of To-Day, HARPER’S NEW MONTHLY MAGAZINE, Mar. 
1887, at 579; Albert F. Heard, Justice and Law in Russia, HARPER’S NEW MONTHLY 
MAGAZINE, May 1888, at 920 [hereinafter Heard, Justice]. 
 38. Heard, Justice, supra note 37, at 930 (reminding American readers that capital 
punishment was abolished in Russia by Queen Elizabeth in 1753 and that even though the 
laws of Finland recognized the death penalty, “not an execution has taken place since it 
cession to Russia in 1809.”). 
 39. SVOD ZAKONOV ROSSIYSKOY IMPERII [SZ] [CODE OF LAWS OF THE RUSSIAN 
EMPIRE] art. 4.  
 40. Marc Szeftel, Personal Inviolability in the Legislation of the Russian Absolute 
Monarchy, 17 AM. SLAVIC AND E. EUR. REV. 1, 2 (1958).  Surprisingly, even though Marc 
Szeftel, Professor Emeritus of the University of Washington, included four works by Richard 
Pipes (RUSSIA UNDER THE OLD REGIME among them) in a 45-page list of sources in his 
fundamental study of the first Russian Constitution, he not only never gave a single citation 
from any publication by Pipes, but even didn’t mention his name anywhere in the book, 
including its last subchapter dedicated exclusively to an overview of main studies in the U.S. 
and other countries of the world of the last period of history of the Russian Empire.   
 41. WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAW 28-29 (1999) [hereinafter RUSSIAN LAW].  
“Even to the revolutionary, the legal profession in Russia has its attraction as a channel for 
effectuating political and social change.” WILLIAM E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 22 (1st ed. 1983) 
[hereinafter SOVIET LAW]. Vladimir Lenin took courses at the Law School of Kazan’ 
University and was a magna cum laude graduate from the Law School of St. Petersburg 
University.  Despite the fact that his brother was executed as a terrorist, Lenin didn’t have a 
problem being admitted to the bar and becoming a practicing attorney. 
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Whereas in England at the end of the eighteenth century, according to 
William Blackstone, the number of “capital statutes,” or the laws imposing 
capital punishment “without benefit of the clergy; or, in other words, to be 
worthy of instant death,” was “no less than a hundred and sixty,”42 and by 
the beginning of the nineteenth century it had reached two hundred and 
twenty–three.43 Capital punishment was abolished from Russian codes 
during the thirteenth and most of the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, under 
Elizabeth from 1742 to 1754, and up until 1775 when Catherine the Great 
used it against six participants of the Emelyan Pugachev rebellion.44  From 
then on until the execution of the five leaders of an armed mutiny (so–called 
Decembrists) in July 1826,45 nobody was executed for political offenses, 
either.46  Since 1812, the death penalty applied for some military crimes, but 
not for common crimes — like murder or rape — though this was 
frequently the case abroad.47 
According to probably the most comprehensive study on capital 
punishment in Russia, a 500–page work by S. Usherovich, the number of 
persons executed (for both criminal and political offenses) during the reign 
of Alexander I (1801–1825) was twenty–four, of Nicholas I (1825–1855) 
was forty–one, and of Alexander III (1881–1894) was thirty–three48  
(including fourteen terrorists).49  Vadim Kozhinov continued the list, adding 
  
 42. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 18 (photo. 
reprint 1979) (1765) (with an introduction by Thomas A. Green).  
 43. 1 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750 4 (1948). 
 44. KOZHINOV, supra note 32, at 35, available at  
http://www.hrono.ru/libris/ruslovo_01.html. 
 45. See, e.g., N. EIDELMAN, CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE TSAR: A PORTRAIT OF THE 
DECEMBRISTS (1985). The authorities could hardly find somebody who would agree to 
execute the Decembrists who were to be hanged (‘to die by the rope’) or simply know how to 
do it.  Eventually, when the would-be executioner was found, he appeared to be so 
inexperienced that three out of five ropes tore and three victims fell down on the ground. 
 46. PETER H. JUVILER, REVOLUTIONARY LAW AND ORDER: POLITICS AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE IN THE USSR 25 (1976). 
 47. See Will Adams, Capital Punishment in Soviet Criminal Legislation, 1922-1965: 
A Code Content Analysis and Graphic Representation, in ON THE ROAD TO COMMUNISM: 
ESSAYS ON SOVIET DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLITICS 79, 79-121 (Roger E. Kanet & Ivan 
Volgyes eds., 1972).  
 48. See S. USHEROVICH, SMERTNYE KAZNI V TSARSKOI ROSSII [DEATH PENALTY IN 
TSARIST RUSSIA] (1933).  See also Donald Rawson, The Death Penalty in Late Tsarist 
Russia: An Investigation of Judicial Procedures, RUSS. HIST., Spring 1984, at 44-45;  S.S. 
Ostroumov, Repressii tsarskogo pravitel’stva protiv revolutsionnogo dvizhenia v Rossii v 
period imperializma (ugolovno-statisticheskoe issledovanie) [Repressions of Tsarist 
Government Against Revolutionary Movement in Russia in the Period  of Imperialism: 
Criminal Statistical Study] 3 VESTN. MGU 35-41 (1976).  See also ALEXANDER S. MIKHLIN, 
THE DEATH PENALTY IN RUSSIA 8-17 (W.E. Butler trans., Simmonds & Hill Publ’n, Kluwer 
Law Int’l 1999). 
 49. One of the fourteen terrorists sentenced to death for his participation in 
assassination attempt on Alexander III was Alexander I. Ulyanov, older brother of Vladimir 
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thirty–one terrorists executed under the reign of Alexander II (1855–1881).  
All in all, between the mid–eighteenth and late nineteenth centuries, the 
number of those sentenced to death and executed in the Russian Empire was 
equal to 135 in “mainland” Russia and about 1,500 in Poland (after the 
Polish rebellion).50   
For comparison, it was in 1785 that the last “witch” was sentenced to 
death and executed in Switzerland.51  In the years of Jacobean terror in 
France (1793–1794) from 70,000 to 500,000 people were arrested, and 
17,000 of them were sentenced to death and executed on a guillotine.52   
A modern British scholar opines: “What the Holocaust and the Gulag are 
for us, the violence of the French Revolution was for the nineteenth century: 
events that alter our understanding of politics and indeed of human 
nature.”53  In just one week of revolutionary events in Paris in June 1848, 
the number of those sentenced to death and executed under French martial 
law was at least 11,000.54 
Similarly, there are no exact figures of how many people perished as a 
result of violent suppression of the Paris Commune in May 1871. The 
  
I. Ulyanov-Lenin, a founder of the Soviet state.  M.N. Gernet, Narodovol’tsy na eshafote 
[Execution of Members of the People’s Will], PRAVO I ZHIZN’, July 1922, at 78-84. 
 50. This figure doesn’t include the number of those who were killed in riots and 
disturbances.  In 1861, the year of serfdom abolishment, there were 1,889 cases of protests in 
the Russian countryside.  In 937 of them (49 per cent), the army was called ‘to assist civil 
authorities.’  However, the use of weapons was extremely rare - in three cases only. (See 
R.V. Narbutov, Pravovoe regulirovanie ispol’zovania vooruzhennykh sil dlya obespechenia 
obschestvennogo poryadka i bezopastnosti v dorevolutsionnoy Rossii [Legal Regulation of 
Use of the Army for Maintenance of the Public Order and Security in Pre-Revolutionary 
Russia], SOVETSKOE GOS. I  PRAVO, Dec. 1991, at 141.  The latest study by Peter Koshel 
which contains a full list of executions between 1878 and 1890: 1878 - 1, 1879 - 16, 1880 - 
5, 1881 - 5, 1882 - 4, 1883 - 1, 1884 - 4, 1885 - 1, 1886 - 5, 1887 - 5, 1888 - 0, 1889 - 3, 
1890 - 2.  In 1901-1905 this number was equal to 93; twenty of them were for military 
crimes.  See P.A. KOSHEL, ISTORIA NAKAZANIY V ROSSII. ISTORIA ROSSIYSKOGO TERRORIZMA 
[HISTORY OF PUNISHMENTS IN RUSSIA. HISTORY OF RUSSIAN TERRORISM] 82 (1995) 
[hereinafter KOSHEL].   
 51. CHERNYAK, note 31, at 191.  In England, the last witch trial was reportedly held 
in 1944.  Old Bailey Court in London used ‘anti-witchcraft’ act of 1795 (!) against a famous 
medium, Helen Dunken, and sentenced her to a nine-month imprisonment.  See Reabilitatsia 
ved’my [Rehabilitation of a Witch], MOSCOWSKIY KOMSOMOLETS,  Feb. 5, 1998, at 3. 
 52. CHERNYAK, supra note 31, at 200. 
 53. ROBERT TOMBS, FRANCE 1814-1914 9 (1996). 
 54. An interesting Russian connection deserves mentioning here.  In 1847, a Russian 
writer Alexander Hertzen emigrated from Russia, which, in his opinion, was the 
‘concentration of the evil’, and whose biggest crime was the execution of five Decembrists.  
In about a year, right before Hertzen’s eyes 11,000 participants of the Paris rebellion were 
executed.  The poor writer nearly went insane and wrote to his friends in Russia: “I wish God 
let the Russians take Paris over, it’s high time to finish this stupid Europe! . . . I am ashamed 
of France . . . . But what is the most terrifying is that not a single Frenchman is ashamed of 
what’s going on . . . .”  KOZHINOV, supra note 32, at 35.  See also SERGEI ERLICH, ISTORIA 
MIFA: “DEKABRISTSKAYA LEGENDA” HERTZENA [HISTORY OF A MYTH: A “DECEMBRISTS’ 
LEGEND” OF HERTZEN] (2006). 
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number of those who were taken prisoners was “nearly 50,000”55 or 
“probably exceeded 50,000.”56 It is estimated that “somewhere near 2,500 
were killed on the barricades” and overall between 15,000 and 40,000  
Parisians became victims of the Thiers regime57 — “a massacre unparalleled 
in nineteenth–century Europe.”58  
A contemporary French historian, however, testified that the actual 
number of victims was higher: the municipal council of Paris paid the 
expenses for burial of 17,000 corpses; but a great number were killed 
outside of Paris.59 But was not the end of the story yet. “The slaughter was 
followed by the transportation New Caledonia of some 5,000 of those 
considered most dangerous.”60  
 
It was long after the end of the Cold War that a Western scholar could 
recognise the obvious:  
[a]nyone imagining the course of Russian pre–modern history to have 
been particularly barbarous or bloodstained should remember the near 
absence, in comparison with Western lands, of witch–hunting, crusading, 
institutionalised capital punishment (abolished under Elizabeth in the mid–
eighteenth century) . . . . [t]he brutal episodes in the reigns of Ivan the 
Terrible or Peter the Great were traumatic because [they were] 
uncharacteristic.61 
As in other countries of Europe, the adoption of a special statute 
regulating emergency powers and states of emergency was a natural and 
inalienable element of the Russian transition to a constitutional monarchy 
and the rule of law.62  It became possible after Alexander II (1855–1881), 
  
 55. J.P.T. BURY & R.P. TOMBS, THIERS 1797-1877: A POLITICAL LIFE 208 (1986). 
 56. EDWARD S. MASON, THE PARIS COMMUNE: AN EPISODE IN THE HISTORY OF THE 
SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 288 (reprt. Howard Fertig, 1967) (1930).  Eight-hundred and fifty 
women were arrested during or after the street fighting. “Along with the women were 
arrested 651 children under the age of 16, all of whom had taken part in the defense of the 
Commune.  Thirty-eight were between the ages of 7 and 13.”  Id. at 291-292. 
 57. Id. at 292-294. 
 58. TOMBS, supra note 53, at 19. 
 59. See, e.g., HENRY LISSAGARY, HISTORY OF THE PARIS COMMUNE OF 1871 321 
(Eleanor Marx trans., New Park Publications 1976) (1876). 
 60. TOMBS, supra note 53, at 19. See also THOMAS MARCH, THE HISTORY OF THE 
PARIS COMMUNE OF 1871 (1896). 
 61. ROBIN MILNER-GULLAND, THE RUSSIANS 228 (1997). 
 62. Among other Russian and foreign scholars, this view is shared by Jonathan W. 
Daly, arguing that “Alexander’s reform placed Russia firmly on the road toward the rule of 
law, meaning, inter alia, the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed 
to the influence of arbitrary power,… or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of 
the government.”  Daly, Significance, supra note 13, at 604 (quoting A. V. Dicey, 
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 202 (8th ed. 1927)).  Dicey’s 
commentaries have always been well known in Russia.  See, e.g., A.V. DICEY, OSNOVY 
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known in Russian history as the Tsar–Liberator, abolished serfdom in 1861 
and instituted Russia’s first significant abridgement of monarchical 
authority and its earliest affirmation of the civil rights of persons by means 
of his Reform of Province and District (Gubernia i Uezd) Self–Government 
and Judicial Reform of 1864.63  The latter crucial act effectively created an 
independent judiciary, thus significantly weakening the autocrat.  It also 
restricted arbitrary arrest, established strict criminal procedure, and placed 
the investigation of all crimes under the supervision of the Procuracy 
(prokuratura), an agency of the Ministry of Justice.  It is so indicative that a 
leading Soviet historian, P.A. Zaionchkovskiy, had to recognise that “the 
apogee of administrative–police arbitrariness” in Russia happened not after 
adoption of the Emergency Law of 14 August 1881, but rather before it—at 
the end of 1879.64 
On 24 January 1878, a member of the “Land and Freedom” (Zemlia i 
volia) terrorist group (founded in late 1876), Vera Zasulich, made an 
attempt on the life of General Fyodor F. Trepov (son of Emperor Nicholas I, 
born out of wedlock), Governor of Russia’s capital St. Petersburg, and 
severely crippled him.65  On 4 August 1878, Sergei Kravchinsky stabbed the 
Chief of Russian Gendarmerie, N.V. Mezentsev, to death.  The next August, 
the “People’s Will” (Narodnaia volia) revolutionary movement was 
founded.  Their program included plans to assassinate ten to fifteen “pillars 
of the current government” in order to provoke panic, paralyse the 
autocracy, and pave the way for revolution.66   
  
GOSUDARSTVENNOGO PRAVA ANGLII [INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION] (1891). 
 63. See, e.g., BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAW, supra note 41, at 28. 
 64. P.A. ZAIONCHKOVSKIY, KRIZIS SAMODERZHAVIA NA RUBEZHE 1870-1880-X 
GODOV [CRISIS OF AUTOCRACY AT THE END OF THE 1870S - IN THE BEGINNING OF THE 1880S] 
91-98, 113, 124 (1964) [hereinafter ZAIONCHKOVSKIY] (An English edition of the book was 
also published with a new introduction by Gary M. Hamburg.  PETER A. ZAIONCHKOVSKY, 
THE RUSSIAN AUTOCRACY IN CRISIS, 1878-1882 (Gary M. Hamburg ed., trans., Academic 
International Press 1979).). 
 65. Deborah Hardy was certainly right when saying that the Zasulich’s case was 
‘unique’ and that it “set a new course for the Russian revolutionary terrorists,” See  DEBORAH 
HARDY, LAND AND FREEDOM THE ORIGINS OF RUSSIAN TERRORISM, 1876-1879 59-60 (1987).  
In March 1878, Zasulich was acquitted in a jury trial.  The acquittal of Zasulich is an 
indication that in the 1870s rights of the jury were firmly protected.  There was no reason for 
the jury members in Russia to be afraid of tsarist persecution for their decision to acquit a 
terrorist.  The country had made a significant progress in its transition to the rule of law.  
Ironically, it was the same way that led Russia to a national disaster of 1917.  See P. A. 
Alexandrov & Judge A. F. Koni, Speeches At the Trial of of Vera Zasulich (1878), in SUD 
PRISYAZHNYKH V ROSSII: GROMKIE UGOLOVNYE PROTSESSY 1864-1917 [JURY TRIALS IN 
RUSSIA: LOUD CRIMINAL PROCESSES, 1864-1917] 281, 281-316 (S. M. Kazantsev, comp. 
1991). 
 66. 1 VLADIMIR BURTSEV & S. M. STEPNIAK, ZA STO LET (1800-1896): SBORNIK PO 
ISTORII POLITICHESKIKH I OBSCHESTVENNYKH DVIZHENIY V ROSSII [A HUNDRED YEARS 
(1800-1896): A COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ON HISTORY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS IN RUSSIA] 151-54 (1897).     
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Alexander II survived six assassination attempts.  On 19 November 
1879, terrorists bombed the tsar’s train and killed and wounded dozens of 
innocent people.  Another well–known failed attempt was an explosion in 
the Winter Palace, the tsar’s residence, detonated by Stepan Khalturin on 5 
February 1880.  The powerful blast destroyed two floors and killed and 
wounded about 70 people, but the tsar and his family escaped again.  The 
explosion proved to be the last straw.67  A week later, Alexander II created 
the Supreme Executive Commission for the Preservation of the State Order 
and Public Tranquillity (Verkhovnaia Rasporiaditel’naia Komissiia po 
okhraneniu gosudarstvennogo poriadka i obschestvennogo spokoistvia) and 
authorised the head of the Commission, Count Mikhail Loris–Melikov, to 
“give any regulations and take any measures . . . for the preservation of state 
order and public tranquillity in St. Petersburg and other localities of the 
[Russian] Empire.”68 
In the next year, the police arrested nearly all of the major activists of the 
People’s Will.  The organisation did not carry out any terrorist acts between 
February 1880 and 1 March 1881, when the seventh and the last desperate 
attempt at regicide became a “success.”  The Russian Tsar Alexander II was 
murdered.69  
Life and history can truly be richer than human imagination.  Could 
anybody have envisioned that a few hours before his assassination, 
Alexander II had given his Royal approval to a plan for creating a 
“Constitution” (known as “Constitution of Count Loris–Melikov”) and an 
elective proto–parliament (“Joint Commission”) with consultative 
functions?70  The project was to be considered by the Council of Ministers 
on 4 March, but the assassination of the tsar drastically changed the mood 
  
 67. See, e.g., ZAIONCHKOVSKIY, supra note 64, at 148, 227. 
 68. For more on the Supreme Executive Commission for the Preservation of the 
State Order and Public Tranquillity and the system of political security and investigation in 
Russia see, for example, Z. I. PEREGUDOVA, POLITICHESKIY SYSK ROSSII 1880-1917 
[POLITICAL INVESTIGATION IN RUSSIA: 1880-1917] (2000).  See also L.M. LYASHENKO, 
TSAR’-OSVOBODITEL’. ZHIZN’ I DEYANIA ALEKSANDRA II [TSAR-LIBERATOR. LIFE AND 
WORK OF ALEXANDER II] (1994). 
 69. For more on Alexander II and his time, see a remarkable study by a famous 
Russian historian of the nineteenth century, SERGEY S. TATISCHEV, IMPERATOR ALEKSANDR 
VTOROY. EGO ZHIZN’ I TSARTSVOVANIE [EMPEROR ALEXANDER II: HIS LIFE AND REIGN] 
(1996).  
 70. As a classic example of double standards of Russian revolutionaries, consider 
this: when in July 1881, four months after assassination of the Russian tsar, the U.S. 
President James A. Garfield was murdered, the Executive Committee of the ‘People’s Will’ 
issued a public statement, saying: “We express our deep condolences to the American people 
and consider our duty on behalf of Russian revolutionaries to protest against violent actions 
like a life attempt of Gito.”  See G.E. MIRONOV, ISTORIA GOSUDARSTVA ROSSIYSKOGO. 
ISTORIKO-BIOGRAPHICHESKIE OCHERKI [HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN STATE: HISTORICAL AND 
BIOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS] 487 (1995). 
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and postponed the long awaited and so desperately needed constitutional 
reforms in the country.71 
On 14 August 1881, five and a half months after the assassination of the 
Russian tsar, his successor, Alexander III, signed an act drafted by the 
Committee of Ministers.  It was the law “On Measures for the Preservation 
of the State Order and Public Tranquillity” (O merakh k okhraneniiu 
gosudarstvennogo poriadka i obschestvennogo spokoistvia).72   
In its opening paragraphs, the decree asserted that ordinary laws had 
proved insufficient to preserve order in the empire so it had become 
necessary to introduce certain “extraordinary” procedures.  Contrary to what 
is said by critics of emergency legislation in the Russian Empire, the 
Ordinance of 1881 did not extraordinarily increase the discretionary powers 
of the Administration.  It actually limited and diminished them, because the 
adoption of the Ordinance meant an annulment of all previous emergency 
decrees (ukaz), which had been issued amid the terrorist campaign to 
murder Alexander II at the end of the 1870s and invested vast arbitrary 
power in the Governors–General.73  As it was acknowledged in an official 
report of 1895, by adoption of the 1881 Emergency Law, the authorities 
hoped to systematise (“to unify”) the “repressive measures employed 
  
 71. N.I. LAZAREVSKY, LEKTSII PO RUSSKOMU GOSUDARSTVENNOMU PRAVU [LECTURES 
ON RUSSIAN STATE LAW. VOL.1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 102-03 (1910). 
 72. SVOD ZAKONOV ROSSIYSKOY IMPERII [SZ] [CODE OF LAWS OF THE RUSSIAN 
EMPIRE] Aug. 14, 1881.  In his attempt to reveal another devilish uniqueness and Byzantine 
slyness of the Russian state and law, Richard Pipes discovered a kind of a conspiracy even in 
the fact how the Ordinance was published. “In a manner characteristic of Russian legislative 
practices, in the official Collection of Statutes and Ordinances this momentous piece of 
legislation is casually sandwiched between a directive approving minor alterations in the 
charter of the Russian Fire Insurance Company and one concerning the administration of a 
technical institute in the provincial town of Cherepovtsy.”  PIPES, supra note 9, at 305 
(emphasis added).  Actually, that quite typical for all (or nearly all) countries of the world 
when a position of a new piece of legislation in a collection of statutes is predetermined 
either by the date when this law was adopted and its registration number (in legal periodicals 
and annual collections: Public Law in the U.S., Public General Acts in Great Britain, etc.) or 
by the alphabetical order (in most selections of the legislation).  It’s a common practice, and 
there is nothing “characteristic of Russian legislative practices” in it. 
 73. For instance, one of such ukaz (issued on 2 April 1879, after another regicide 
attempt) granted the Governors-General the right to transfer to martial courts any persons 
whose actions were deemed potentially “harmful to public order and tranquillity,” to arrest or 
banish any person, to close any periodical publication, and, as if that were insufficient, “to 
take any measures . . . deemed necessary for the preservation of tranquillity.” See 
ZAIONCHKOVSKIY, supra note 64, at 87 (emphasis added).  The positions of three new 
(‘temporary’) Governors-General (in St.Petersburg, Khar’kov, and Odessa) were created and 
added to the existing three (in Moscow, Kiev and Warsaw).  Each of them was empowered to 
subject to his authority the three to five provinces constituting a local military district which, 
taken together, comprehended 21 of the 50 provinces of European Russia, plus the ten of the 
Polish Kingdom. 
78 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:1 
 
against anti–government elements,”74 rather than to introduce any new 
measures. 
The Emergency Law established two forms of a state of emergency, or a 
“state of exception” (iskluchitel’noe polozhenie), as it was called in Russia: 
“reinforced security” (or “reinforced protection,” usilennaia okhrana) and 
“extraordinary security” (or “extraordinary protection,” chrezvychainaia 
okhrana).  It also contained “rules for places not declared in a state of 
exception.”75  The law fully concentrated the struggle against subversion in 
the hands of the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) where it has largely 
remained since. 
Reinforced security (RS), as a milder form of a state of emergency, could 
be declared by MVD upon a request of city and provincial governors.  The 
Governors–General were also able to impose it on their own authority, but 
such decision was still subject to approval by the MVD.76  RS could be 
introduced for a period of up to one year.  
Extraordinary security (ES) required both the Committee of Ministers’ 
and the Emperor’s sanction,77 and lasted only six months. Reestablishment 
of any form of a state of emergency required a formal decree.78 
In regions under a state of RS, the Governors–General (or Governors in 
provinces lacking one), while retaining the powers enumerated above, were 
authorised: 
- to issue binding orders enforceable with penalties of up to three 
months’ imprisonment or a 500 rouble fine;79 
- to forbid social, public, and private gatherings; 
- to shut down commercial and industrial enterprises either for a 
specific period or for the duration of the emergency; 
- to deny individuals the right to reside in their jurisdictions 
(vospreschat’ prebyvanie);80 and 
- to transfer to military courts any case in the interest of preserving 
order.81  
  
 74. OBZOR DEIATEL’NOSTI DEPARTAMENTA POLITSII ZA TSARSTVOVANIE V BOZE 
POCHIVSHEGO GOSUDARIA IMPERATORA ALEKSANDRA III (1 MARTA 1881 - 20 OKTIABRYA 1894 
GG.) [A REVIEW OF ACTIVITIES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT UNDER THE LATE EMPEROR 
ALEXANDER III (1 MARCH 1881 – 20 OCTOBER 1894)] [hereinafter GARF] (STATE ARCHIVE 
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION) 102 (1895). 
 75. SVOD ZAKONOV ROSSIYSKOY IMPERII [SZ] [CODE OF LAWS OF THE RUSSIAN 
EMPIRE] Aug. 14, 1881, art. 28–31. 
 76. Id. at art. 7. 
 77. Id. at art. 9. 
 78. Id. at art. 12. 
 79. Id. at art. 15. 
 80. Id. at art. 16. 
2010] A Lost War on Terror 79 
 
Police and gendarmerie were permitted: 
- to detain any person “inspiring substantial suspicion” from the point 
of view of state security, but for only two weeks (one month with 
permission from the governor); or  
- to search any premises on pure suspicion of involvement in the 
commission of a state crime.82   
Finally, provincial and city governors were authorised to declare any 
non–elective local officials employed by the zemstva, city governments or 
courts as “untrustworthy” or “politically unreliable” (neblagonadezhnyi) 
and to order his instantaneous dismissal.83  
Under a state of ES, the Governors–General retained all of the 
prerogatives conferred by RS and were further authorised: 
- to create special military–police units with broad powers for the 
restoration of order;  
- to transfer to military courts entire categories of state crimes;  
- to sequester any private property or source of income “harmful to 
state or public security”; 
- to issue binding administrative orders and to impose fines of up to 
3,000 roubles for failure to comply with them;  
- to declare any crimes liable to administrative punishment of the same 
magnitude just mentioned;  
- to remove from office any civil servant (even locally elected 
officials, as distinct from hired employees) up to and including rank 
four (deistvitel’nyi statskii sovetnik or General–Maior);  
- to prohibit zemstvo and other public–institution meetings;  
- to suspend newspapers and other publications; and  
- to close schools and other educational institutions for up to one 
month.84  
  
 81. SVOD ZAKONOV ROSSIYSKOY IMPERII [SZ] [CODE OF LAWS OF THE RUSSIAN 
EMPIRE] Aug. 14, 1881, art. 17. 
 82. Id. at art. 21 
 83. Id. at art. 20. 
 84. Id. at art. 26(a)-(i). 
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Unlike the 5 April 1879 law on the Governors–General, the Emergency 
Law contained no carte blanche provision that allowed them to take “any 
measures deemed necessary for the preservation of tranquillity.”  
The section establishing “rules for places not declared in a state of 
exception” was a peculiar feature of the Emergency Law, distinguishing it 
from similar legislation in other European countries of the nineteenth 
century.  It empowered all police and gendarme authorities in any locality 
of the Russian Empire:  
- to search, arrest and detain for up to seven days persons suspected of 
involvement in the planning or perpetration of state crimes, or of 
belonging to illegal organisations;  
- to propose the exile (vysylka) of such persons for up to five years;85  
- upon obtaining the consent of the Ministry of Justice, to transfer to 
military courts specified state–crime cases, as well as cases of violent 
resistance to, or physical attacks against, administrative officials in 
their line of duty,86 if only a state of reinforced of extraordinary 
security was declared anywhere in the Empire.87 
Ninety–five years later, a norm similar to the last provision of the 
Russian Emergency Law was included into the Constitution of India. The 
Constitution (Forty–Second Amendment) Act (adopted on 18 December 
1976) consisted of fifty–nine articles and was the biggest amendment ever 
made to the Indian Constitution (it was also larger than constitutions of 
some countries of the world).  Articles 48, 49, and 52 of the act made a 
number of changes to Part XVIII of the Constitution (“Emergency 
Provisions.”)  According to the articles, even if a state of emergency is not 
declared in some “part of the territory of India,” an emergency regime 
(including extension of powers of federal authorities, suspension of certain 
rights and freedoms, etc.) can still be extended to “any State or Union 
territory,” and “if and in so far as the security of India or any part of the 
territory thereof is threatened by activities or in relation to the territory of 
India in which the Proclamation of Emergency is in operation.”88 
In other words, if a state of emergency is declared in Amritsar (in 
Punjab), an emergency regime can be extended to Delhi, located in several 
hundred miles from Punjab, if the President of India “is satisfied” (upon an 
“advise” of the Prime Minister, as determined by the Constitution under 
  
 85. Id. at art. 29, 32-36. 
 86. Id. at art. 31. 
 87. See V.F. NEKRASOV, A.V. BORISOV, M.G. DETKOV, ET AL, ORGANI I VOISKA MVD 
ROSSII. KRATKIY ISTORICHESKY OCHERK [ORGANS AND TROOPS OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL 
AFFAIRS. A BRIEF HISTORICAL ESSAY] 27-28 (1996); Szeftel, supra note 40, at 150.   
 88. MAHENDRA P. SINGH, V.N. SHUKLA’S CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 816-17 (8th ed. 
1990). 
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Article 74) that events in Amritsar “threaten . . . security” of the capital of 
India.89  Similarly, if a state of exception was declared in Moscow, an 
emergency regime could be extended to Vladivostok in the Russian Far 
East, on the coast of the Pacific Ocean. 
In sum, the Emergency Law of 1881 (a) placed the system of extra–legal 
arrest and punishment under the supervision of the home minister (but 
granted him fewer prerogatives than the director of the Supreme Executive 
Commission of 1880); (b) extended the right to arbitrary arrest to the 
regular police (but strictly defined the period of detention), and (c) 
empowered Governors and Governors–General to subject political suspects 
to administrative exile (but less extensively and with shorter terms of exile 
than under the 5 April 1879 law) and to transfer them to military courts. 
Although the Law was defined as “temporary,” it was renewed in 1884 
for another period of three years and then regularly afterwards. 
V.  IMPLEMENTATION IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 
As far as the implementation of the Emergency Law of 1881 is 
concerned, on 4 September 1881 a state of “reinforced security” was 
declared in ten provinces (most notably, in St. Petersburg and Moscow), and 
several smaller localities in three other provinces of the Russian Empire 
(compared to 21 provinces and Poland affected by the edict of 5 April 
1879!).90  In 1901–1902, the reinforced security was extended to include 
two full provinces, and parts of six other provinces, plus three major cities. 
War with Japan (1904–1905) and especially the first (failed) Russian 
“revolution” of 1905–1907 made the government, on the one hand,  
implement the Emergency Law more actively, and, on the other hand, 
initiate drastic legal and social reforms, culminating in the Emperor’s 
Manifesto “On Improvement of the State Order” of 17 October 1905, 
instituting a constitutional monarchy with the first elected Russian 
Parliament (the State Duma).  
By January 1907, in Daly’s count, martial law was in effect in fifty–
seven different localities across the empire, including twenty–one 
provinces, twenty–five districts, nine cities, and along two railroads, where 
it remained in force until gradually lifted between 1908 and 1913, especially 
in 1908–1909.91  In 1906–1907, a state of extraordinary security was 
established in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and fifteen other localities. 
  
 89. Id. at art. 74.  See the complete text of the 42nd Amendment on the official 
“India Code” web site, http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/amend/amend42.htm. 
 90. SOBRANIE UZAKONENIY I RASPORIAZHENIY PRAVITEL’STVA, IZDAVAEMYE PRI 
PRAVITEL’STVUIUSCHEM SENATE [COLLECTION OF BY-LAWS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE 
GOVERNMENT, ISSUED UNDER THE GOVERNING SENATE] 1881, No. 94,  1554-1555 (Russ.). 
 91. Daly, Significance, supra note 13, at 623 (quoting GARF, supra note 65).  See 
also PRAVO, March 12 1906. 
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Overall, Michael Gernet (1874–1953), a distinguished Russian scholar 
and author of a fundamental five–volume study of the Russian penitentiary 
system, counted sixty guberniyas and oblasts which had been placed under 
reinforced and extraordinary protection in 1905–1907, and twenty–five 
guberniyas and oblasts where martial law had been introduced.  However, 
by 1914 there was no martial law anywhere in the Russian Empire, 
extraordinary protection was in effect only in one isolated case (in Yalta and 
its district, around the Emperor’s summer residence in the Crimea on the 
Black Sea) and reinforced protection existed in just a few localities.92   
The normalisation of the situation was abruptly interrupted and 
drastically changed because of the imminence of the war with Germany.  
The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June 
1914 provided Austria–Hungary with an excuse to take aggressive actions 
against Serbia.  Bound by treaty to Serbia, Russia announced mobilization 
of its vast army in her defense, and simultaneously introduced martial law 
(in its eastern and southern provinces), or a state of ES, throughout the 
whole Empire.  The decision was quite understandable given the 
forthcoming German declaration of war against Russia on 1 August 1914.   
It is a debatable question whether or not a broad imposition of a state of 
emergency (in its different forms) in Russia in the years of the first 
revolution of 1905–1907 was justified.  There are two main reasons that 
probably allow us to give an affirmative answer.  
The first of them is more of a “technical” character; it concerns the 
quantity of law enforcement personnel of the Russian Empire.  Police forces 
in tsarist Russia have always been microscopic, miserably diminutive, and 
chronically understaffed.  It is important to remember that at the turn of the 
twentieth century, rural areas of the largest country on earth (populated by 
more than 90 million peasants at that time) were policed by only 8,456 
ordinary police sergeants and constables.  In 1900, a regular rural policeman 
could have a “beat” of 1,800 square miles and 50,000–100,000 people.93  
“Even in 1914 there were fewer than 15,000 gendarmes throughout the 
empire . . . .”94  Jonathan W. Daly makes an interesting comparison, 
noticing that, in 1897, France had about forty percent more policemen than 
Russia, even though France at that time was a “country with three times 
fewer people and forty times less territory.”95 
Indeed, Vera Figner, a famous revolutionary, “symbolising,” in the 
words of another legendary terrorist, Boris Savinkov, “the best traditions of 
  
 92. See 5 M.N. GERNET, ISTORIA TSARSKOY TUR’MY [HISTORY OF TSARIST 
PRISON] 90 (1956). 
 93. See NEIL B. WEISSMAN, REFORM IN TSARIST RUSSIA: THE STATE BUREAUCRACY 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 1900-1914 10-11(1981). 
 94. D. C. B. Lieven, The Security Police, Civil Rights, and the Fate of the Russian 
Empire, 1855-1917, in CIVIL RIGHTS IN IMPERIAL RUSSIA 235, 240 (Olga Crisp & Linda 
Edmonson eds., 1989). 
 95. DALY, AUTOCRACY, supra note 13, at 9. 
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the revolutionary movement,”96 recalled that “in Petersburg itself, 
propaganda, agitation, and organisation were carried on a broad scale.  The 
lack of police–nagging and of round–ups by the Gendarmerie . . . was very 
favourable to work among the students and the workers.”97  
Figner’s testimony is definitely accurate.  One may recall the sad 
recognition of deputy head of the tsarist “secret police” (so–called Third 
Department) Shultz that “it was impossible to find police–spies and plain–
clothed agents in Russia.”98  And how large was the total staff of the central 
apparatus of the Third Department itself, known to modern readers thanks 
to numerous “terrifying” stories about it running like a trend through 
writings of many Western and liberal Russian authors?  At the time of its 
creation on 3 July 1826,  the Third Department had sixteen (!) persons; at 
the height its activity in 1873 it had fifty–eight, and when the Department 
was abolished by Alexander II (on 6 August 1880), it had seventy–two 
persons, including full–time officers, agents and contractors.99  “A 
ridiculously small number for even the remotest Cheka (Lenin’s secret 
police—the future KGB) provincial headquarters in the country,” Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn sarcastically observed.100  Solzhenitsyn’s observation remains 
valid even when taken into account that the head of the Third Department 
was also automatically the chief of the Gendarmerie Corps.  In 1826, the 
Corps consisted of not more than 4,278 persons for the whole empire.101 
The Russian penitentiary system was too soft and ineffective.  Quite 
typical is the example of Felix Dzerzhinsky, future founder and first head of 
the Cheka.  Between 1897 and 1917 (to be precise, in 1897, 1900, 1905, 
1906, 1908, and 1912), he was arrested six times; three times he was 
sentenced to Siberian exile and each time escaped penalty, once after 
serving just seven days of a life sentence.102  Over the course of a single 
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year beginning in October 1905, there were 1,951 robberies (with seven 
million roubles confiscated); in 1,691 of these cases, the revolutionaries 
escaped detention.103 
On 1 March 1917, several days after the beginning of the so–called 
“Bourgeois Revolution in Russia,”  a Moscow mob stormed Butyrki prison 
and released its inhabitants, including Dzerzhinsky, who had been serving 
his sentence there.  A very informative study by Lennard Gerson contains 
an apparent mistake when the author writes about “hundreds of political 
prisoners . . . released from their cells” in Butyrki in March 1917.104  Most 
inhabitants of prisons were ordinary criminals, such as murderers, thieves, 
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burglars, etc.  Alexander Solzhenitsyn gave an exact figure (taken from 
local newspapers of that period) of political prisoners released from the 
Tambov Prison: “[t]he February Revolution, which opened wide the doors 
of the Tambov Prison, found there political prisoners in the number of . . . 
seven (7) persons.”105  It is very unlikely that Butyrki contained many more 
“political prisoners” than the Tambov Prison or any other jail in the Russian 
provinces.  The fact that Dzerzhinsky was known in Butyrki as “Prisoner 
217” does not necessarily mean that there were “hundreds of political 
prisoners” in that or any other prison in Russia. 
The elegance and ease with which Dzerzhinsky, Trotsky, Stalin and 
many other revolutionaries in Russia were able to escape Siberian exile is 
also unquestionable proof of mildness and “liberalism” of the penitentiary 
system in Tsarist Russia, especially when compared to the system later 
created by the Bolsheviks.106  
The second reason justifying a broad imposition of a state of exception in 
1905–1907 is more substantive.  In the beginning of the twentieth century, 
social and political threats to the Russian state order were truly grave.  It 
would be fair to say that this was the bloodiest period in the whole previous 
history of Russia, except during times when the country was at war.  Critics 
of Russia never miss this opportunity to highlight the number of people 
sentenced to death in the 1900s.  Indeed, according to official statistics, in 
seven months of existence of “field courts–martial” (19 August 1906–April 
1907), 683 persons were sentenced to death.  The “field courts–martial” 
were not the only institution that could try offenders and sentence them to 
death.  According to S.A. Stepanov’s calculation, the general number of 
capital punishments in 1906–1907 was equal to 1,102, and in 1906–1909 
equalled 2,694.  P. Koshel’s numbers are smaller: 245 in 1906, 624 in 1907, 
1,340 in 1908, and 540 in 1909.107  After the peak in 1907–1909, the 
number of death sentences gradually went down to 116 in January–March 
of 1910 (as compared with zero to twelve annually before 1906).108  Of 
course, not all of those persons were actually executed.  In many cases, 
death sentences were changed to long prison terms.  According to official 
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Russkie vedomosti, for instance, out of seventy–one people sentenced to 
death in March 1910, the number executed was fifteen.109  
As a comparison with the Stalin period, according to the latest and most 
reliable statistics (based on archival evidence), in 1921 through 1953, the 
repressive agencies (Cheka, OGPU, NKVD and MVD) persecuted 
4,060,306 people for political reasons; as many as 799,455 of them were 
sentenced to capital punishment by firing squad.  A tidal wave of 
persecutions swept the country in 1937–1938, when 1.3 million Soviet 
citizens were sentenced to hard labour under Article 58 of the Criminal 
Code (“counterrevolutionary crimes”), and more than a half of them 
(682,000) were executed.  At least forty million people were sentenced to 
prison terms in 1923–1953.  As many as 2.6 million languished in prisons in 
1950, and another 2.3 million lived in special settlements (according to data 
from the late 1940s).110 
Still, the figure of 2,694 (those who were sentenced to death from 1906–
1909) is really terrifying, for it was larger than the number of people who 
had been executed in all of the previous history of Russia.  The fact that the 
number of executions in the Russian Empire in 1906–1909 was more than 
ten times smaller than in Paris in May 1871 is hardly an excuse here. 
One possible explanation, however, is the number of victims among 
Russian citizens who were assassinated by terrorists. The “systematic 
extermination of the most evil or prominent individuals in the government” 
and the “mass extermination of the government and in general of 
individuals by whom is preserved or might be preserved one or another 
structure that we deplore” had traditionally been major goals of 
revolutionaries in Russia since “Land and Freedom.”111  In only sixteen 
months (from February 1905 to May 1906), 1,273 “exploiters” and “tsarist 
dogs” were murdered, including eight Governors and Governors–General, 
five Vice Governors and Counsellors, four Generals, fifty–one land owners, 
fifty–four entrepreneurs, twenty–nine bankers, twenty–one polizeimeisters, 
554 policemen and police officers, 265 gendarmes and gendarme officers, 
257 guards, eighty–five civil servants, and twelve clergymen.112  According 
to official statistics, in 1906–1909 this figure was equal to 5,946.113  The 
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general number for the 1900s was approximately 17,000 (!),114 including 
Minister of People’s Education (a former Professor of Roman Law and 
President of the Moscow State University) Nikolay Bogolepov (14 February 
1901), Ministers of the Interior Dmitry Sipyagin (2 April 1902) and 
Viacheslav von Plehve (15 July 1904), Great Duke (uncle of Emperor 
Nicholas II, the Governor–General of Moscow) Sergei Alexandrovich 
Romanov (4 February 1905), and finally—after nine previous attempts—the 
Prime Minister of Russia (and simultaneously Minister of the Interior) Peter 
Stolypin (1 September 1911).115 
The first Russian Constitution (Basic State Laws of 23 April 1906)116 
reformed, inter alia, the legal mechanism of a state of emergency.  Article 
15 of the Constitution drastically reduced the number of those who 
possessed a right to introduce a state of emergency.  Before April 1906, 
martial law could be declared not only by the Emperor, but also by the 
Chief Commander of the Army, while reinforced protection (but not 
extraordinary protection) could be declared by the Minister of the Interior.  
The declaration of either form of a state of emergency became strictly a 
privilege of “Supreme Administration” from April 1906 on: “[o]ur 
Sovereign the Emperor declares localities to be under martial law or in a 
state of exception” (iskluchitel’noe polozhenie).117  The last Article in 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution (“On Rights and Responsibilities of Russian 
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Subjects”)118 left to “special laws” the determination of what rights and 
freedoms could be suspended on a territory declared “under martial law or a 
state of exception.”  Since neither Article 15 nor Article 41 defined 
conditions under which a state of emergency was to be declared, the 
evaluation of those conditions, as well as deciding whether and when to 
place a locality under any form of a state of emergency, remained within the 
Emperor’s discretion. 
Like most other constitutions adopted in the nineteenth to early twentieth 
century, the Basic State Laws of the Russian Empire of 1906 also contained 
a provision confirming the right of the “Sovereign Emperor,” as the head of 
the state, to exercise “legislative action” if it was required by “extraordinary 
circumstances.”119  
The institution of emergency decrees as a surrogate form of a “state of 
emergency” was a component of the constitutional law of many countries of 
the world, including Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, 
Montenegro, Japan, Argentina.  The institution of emergency decrees was 
an integral part of legal systems of the majority of German states, where it 
was known as Nothverordnungen: Angalt, Baden, Braunsweig, Waldek, 
Wurtemberg, Gessen, Lippe, Oldenburg, Reiss, Saksen–Altenburg and 
Saksen–Weimar, Saksonia, Schaumburg–Lippe, Schvartzburg–
Zondersgauzen, and Schvartzburg–Rudolfstadt.120 
Comparative analysis of the constitutional provisions contained in 
Article 87 of the Russian Constitution of 1906 shows that Russian 
emergency regulations were better defined and less “authoritarian” than 
respective provisions of many European constitutions.   
Emergency decrees of the Russian Emperor could be issued only “whilst 
the State Duma is in recess,” and could not introduce any changes or 
alterations “in the Fundamental Laws, in the statutes of the State Council 
and State Duma or in the regulations governing elections to the Council and 
the Duma.”  Moreover, an emergency decree could not operate indefinitely. 
According to the same Article 87, “[s]hould such a measure not be 
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introduced into the Duma as a bill within two months from the date of its 
next meeting . . . it loses force.”121 
VI. RUSSIAN EMERGENCY LAW IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Russia was passing through a 
painful period of long awaited large–scale social reforms and rapid 
economic growth.  “Give us twenty years of peaceful development,” Prime 
Minister of Russia Peter Stolypin declared in his famous speech, “and you 
won’t recognise the country.”122  His credo was, “[w]e need great Russia, 
not great calamities.”123  Four years before his assassination, in a speech in 
the Duma on 13 March 1907, Stolypin defended the use of emergency 
measures, including martial courts, against revolutionary terrorists.  The 
words of Stolypin deserve a full citation for they contained the most 
complete rationale for the use of emergency powers in pre–Bolshevik years:  
We have heard here accusations against the government . . . . We have 
heard that it is a shame and disgrace for Russia that such measures as field 
courts–martial have been resorted to . . . . But when in danger, the state 
must revert to the most rigorous, the most exceptional measures in order to 
avert disintegration.  This was, this is, and this will be so always and 
everywhere.  This is the principle of human nature that lies in the nature of 
the state itself.  When a house burns, gentlemen, you break into a strange 
apartment, you break the doors, you break the windows.  When a person is 
sick, he is treated by poisons.  When a murderer attacks you, you kill him.  
This system is recognized by all states . . . Gentlemen, there are fateful 
moments in the life of a state, when . . . one must choose between the 
integrity of theories and the integrity of the fatherland . . . I am asking 
myself . . . has the government the right with regard to its faithful servants, 
who are subjected to deadly danger every moment, to make an open 
concession to the revolution?  After having considered this question, after 
having weighed it thoroughly, the government came to the conclusion that 
the country expects from it a demonstration not of weakness but of faith.  
We wish to believe, we must believe, gentlemen, that we will hear words 
of appeasement from you, that you will stop the bloody madness [of the 
revolutionary terror], that you will pronounce the word which will force us 
all to start, not the destruction of Russia’s historical building, but its 
rebuilding, remodelling and adornment.124   
  
 121. SZEFTEL, supra note 116, at 99.  
 122. See, e.g., Stolypin, Petr Abramovich, CHRONOS 
http://www.hrono.info/libris/stolypin/stpn1_04.html. 
 123. Id. 
 124. SAMUEL KUCHEROV, COURTS, LAWYERS AND TRIALS UNDER THE LAST THREE 
TSARS 207 (Greenwood Press 1974) (1953) (citing GOSUDARSTVENNAYA DUMA, VTOROY 
SOZYV: STENOGRAFICHESKIY OTCHET (1907)).   
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It is always a problem and a challenge for any transforming and 
modernising (or, in Stolypin’s words, “rebuilding and remodelling”) society 
to keep preserving law and order using exclusively liberal methods.  This 
observation is particularly relevant to the situation in such an enormous, 
multi–ethnic, multi–religious, and multi–linguistic country as the Russian 
Empire at the end of the nineteenth and in the beginning of the twentieth 
centuries.  In the final count, it is not “excessive” use of emergency powers 
in pre–revolutionary years in Russia that should be criticised, but, on the 
contrary, a lack of sufficient and effective employment of it. 
What amazes observers is that “Russia’s rulers permitted unrest and 
disorder—in the midst of a major war—to grip the entire country before 
taking decisive measures.”125  Until 1905, a strong form of the state of 
emergency (“extraordinary security”) was never introduced, and scarcely 
any “political criminals” received a punishment harsher than administrative 
exile.  The Russian “government unsheathed its mightiest weapons only as 
the crisis reached its apex.  Then, almost as if to compensate for earlier 
dilatoriness, it resorted to the harshest form of emergency legislation: 
martial law” (voennoe polozhenie).126 
When writing about the Russian Emergency Law, Richard Pipes agreed 
with Peter B. Struve that “the real difference between Russia of that time 
and the rest of the civilised world lay “in the omnipotence of the political 
police” which had become the essence of the Russian monarchy.”127  
In reality, at the turn of the twentieth century, Russia was no longer an 
absolute monarchy given the independent judiciary, free press,128 elective 
parliament, and local self–governments.  In the opinion of William E. 
Butler, one of the most authoritative English–speaking specialists in 
Russian law, the Criminal Code (Ugolovnoe ulozhenie) of 1903 “represented 
the most advanced statement of criminal jurisprudence in Europe,” and a draft 
Civil Code (Grazhdanskoe ulozhenie) of 1910–1913 “achieved the same 
standard of technical and substantive proficiency.”129 
As mentioned before, the 1906 Basic State Laws contained a separate 
chapter “On Rights and Responsibilities of Russian Subjects” whose fifteen 
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articles (Art. 27–41) could be called the Russian Bill of Rights.130  They 
included all customary freedoms except the right of petition.   
According to the Constitution, no one could be:  
a) “prosecuted for a criminal action otherwise than in a manner determined 
by law”;131  
b) “placed under guard [arrested] otherwise than in the cases determined 
by law”;132  
c) “tried and punished except for criminal actions foreseen by penal laws 
in force at the time of the perpetration of these actions.”133   
 
“Everyone’s domicile” and “property” were declared “inviolable.”134  
“Every Russian subject” had the right:  
a) “to choose freely his place of residence and his occupation, to acquire 
and to transfer property and to travel freely [without molestation, 
besprepyatstvenno] beyond the limits of the State”;135  
b) “to hold meetings, peacefully and without arms, for purposes not 
contrary to laws”;136 
c) “within the limits fixed by law”, to “express his thoughts orally and in 
writing, as well as disseminate them in print or otherwise”;137  
d) “to form societies and unions for purposes not contrary to laws”;138  
e) to “enjoy freedom of religion [svoboda very].”139   
Foreigners who sojourned in Russia also enjoyed “the rights of Russian 
subjects within the limitations fixed by the law.”140  Trial by jury was not 
specifically mentioned in this list of rights, but it had already been a part of 
Russian legislation since the judicial reform of 1864.  
  
 130. SVOD ZAKONOV ROSSIYSKOY IMPERII [SZ] [CODE OF LAWS OF THE RUSSIAN 
EMPIRE] Aug. 14, 1881, art. 27-41.  See also Szeftel, supra note 116, at 88-90. 
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EMPIRE] Aug. 14, 1881, art. 30. 
 132. Id. at art. 31.  
 133. Id. at art. 32. 
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 137. SVOD ZAKONOV ROSSIYSKOY IMPERII [SZ] [CODE OF LAWS OF THE RUSSIAN 
EMPIRE] Aug. 14, 1881, art. 37. 
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Even before adoption of the Constitution of 1906, the police and 
interrogating officers were operating under constraints. “After the judicial 
reform of 1864, and definitely after 1881, the security police had no judicial 
or punitive functions,” D. Lieven rightly asserted.141  A.I. Spiridovich 
recalled that “the arrest of each person, even under the Okhrana’s 
[emergency] rights, had to have serious causes,” and that the “arrest in 
particular of a member of the intelligentsia or a student would lead to 
immediate telephone calls from the Procuracy asking for reasons; in the 
event of a prolonged period of detention under arrest, the Procuracy would 
press hard for the suspect’s release.”142  In an objective assessment of an 
American scholar, “the late imperial Russian polity was a regime in 
transition from absolutism to constitutionalism” and the Emergency Law 
was a “sign of that progression,” a sign of Russia’s “uneasy transition from 
an absolutist to a constitutional order.”143 
Marc Szeftel’s criticism of the Emergency Law for the fact that it 
allegedly “obviously failed its purpose, when it became evident that it could 
not prevent the major disorders of 1905,”144 is hardly relevant.  In fact, 
Szeftel’s comment is a mirror reflection of statements by certain dogmatic 
scholars of the Communist period.  Indeed, some Soviet jurists argued that 
emergency legislation and a state of emergency (as a legal institution) 
inevitably “lead” to “arbitrary rule, police repression, and governmental 
abuse,” whereas Szeftel claims that the emergency law failed to “prevent” 
disorders.145  
In reality, “[n]o statute can guarantee the successful resolution of [any] 
crisis,” exigency, or emergency; but what a law can and should do is to 
provide a “structure politically conductive to a solution.”146  It is not a 
“purpose” of the legal mechanism of a state of emergency in any country of 
the world to “prevent” disorder.  Moreover, as it was indicated in the 1985 
“Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” a state of emergency 
is not supposed to be of a “preventive nature” and “may not be imposed 
merely because of an apprehension of potential danger.”147  In Professor 
Szeftel’s defence, however, it might be stated that his excellent book was 
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published four years before the issuance of the UN report and eight years 
before formulation of the “Siracusa Principles.”   
Again, it was not the harshness and toughness of the Russian emergency 
law or alleged “administrative arbitrariness” in its implementation that 
accelerated the end of the Russian Empire and that deserves condemnation, 
but rather neglect and carelessness of the authorities (especially by the State 
Duma) and their inability to apprehend real and actual danger presented to 
the state and society by revolutionary terrorism.  
P.N. Durnovo, head of the Police Department (1884–1893) and the 
Ministry of the Interior (1905–1906) repeatedly underlined the many 
weaknesses of law enforcement agencies in Russia, and five years before 
the revolution (on 26 January 1912) rhetorically exclaimed, “[l]et any of us 
ask himself if order is guaranteed under the present extremely weak police 
force.”148  In February of 1914, in his famous memorandum,149 Durnovo 
warned that the war with Germany, which actually was to begin in five 
months, would lead to radical social revolution if necessary protective 
measures were not undertaken.  Mikhail Menshikov, a leading Russian 
journalist of the pre–revolutionary period (who was executed by Bolsheviks 
in 1918), in a series of articles titled An Offensive Struggle (1911), criticised 
the government and noted that even the official legal term “protection” 
(okhrana) bespoke of a totally inadequate (“defensive”) rather than a more 
decisive (“offensive”) character of the counter–terrorist and counter–
revolutionary measures in the country.150  Neither of those warnings, nor 
Machiavelli’s prophecy about the states that will be ruined “when grave 
occasions occur,” if “in time of danger” they “cannot resort to a 
dictatorship,”151 was ever appreciated by the government of Nicholas II. 
CONCLUSION 
Extreme liberal reforms of the Provisional Government (formed after the 
February 1917 “bourgeois revolution”) and irresponsible concession of the 
last tsar to declare his abdication had a suicidal effect and removed the last 
obstacles on the way of the Bolsheviks to power.  It is no surprise that 
democratic “achievements” of the Provisional Government were warmly 
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praised by the leader of the October Revolution Vladimir Lenin, who called 
“new” Russia, “the freest, most progressive country in the world.”152   
Thanks to, first, the lack of political will by the tsarist regime and its shy 
unwillingness to decisively fight grave enemies of the Russian society, and 
second, a fatal misunderstanding of national interests of Russia by the 
Provisional Government (February–October 1917), the mechanism of self–
preservation of the Russian state was never effectively implemented and 
was ultimately destroyed—with Russia herself. 
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